A Privacy-Preserving Protocol for Network-Neutral Caching in ISP Networks by Andreoletti, Davide et al.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2950593, IEEE Access
A Privacy-Preserving Protocol for Network-Neutral
Caching in ISP Networks
Davide Andreoletti1, 2, Omran Ayoub2, Cristina Rottondi3, Silvia Giordano1, Giacomo Verticale2, and Massimo Tornatore2
1Networking Laboratory, University of Applied Sciences of Southern Switzerland, Manno, Switzerland, Email: {name.surname}@supsi.ch
2Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy, Email: {name.surname}@polimi.it
3Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Politecnico di Torino
Torino, Italy, Email: {name.surname}@polito.it
Abstract—By performing in-network caching, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) allow Content Providers (CPs) to serve contents
from locations closer to users. In this way, the pressure of
content delivery on ISPs’ network is alleviated, and the users’
Quality-of-Experience (QoE) improved. Due to its impact on
QoE, caching has been recently considered as a form of traffic
prioritization in the debate on Network Neutrality (NN). A
possible approach to perform NN-compliant caching consists
in assigning the same portion of cache storage to all the CPs.
However, this static subdivision does not consider the different
popularities of the CPs’ contents and is therefore inefficient.
Alternatively, the cache can be subdivided among the CPs
proportionally to the popularity of their contents. However, CPs
consider this information private and are reluctant to disclose it.
In this work, we propose a protocol to perform a popularity-driven
subdivision of the caches’ storage in a privacy-preserving and
network-neutral fashion. The protocol is based on the Shamir
Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme and is designed to ensure a NN-
compliant subdivision of the caches while preserving the privacy
of both CPs and ISP (i.e., contents’ popularity and caches’ size
are not disclosed). Through dynamic simulation, we show that
the popularity-driven cache subdivision (enforced by using our
protocol) outperforms several baseline approaches in terms of
overall network Resource Occupation (RO) and caching Hit-
Ratios. Thanks to our numerical results, we observe that the
frequency of execution of the protocol has a significant impact
on the RO, and that the ISP can tune this frequency to minimize
its RO while introducing an acceptable data overhead. Because
of this tuning, several CPs may experience a loss with respect to
the hit-ratio that they would obtain by independently choosing
the frequency of execution. This loss is very limited, and the
employment of the protocol is therefore beneficial to all the
involved parties, especially since, by using it, CPs are guaranteed
that the ISP behaves in a network-neutral manner.
Index Terms—network neutrality; privacy; content providers;
privacy-preserving caching
I. INTRODUCTION
Online video streaming, especially Video-on-Demand
(VoD), has been a main driving force for the recent escalation
in the overall Internet traffic, both for fixed and mobile users.
Cisco predicts that, by 2022, 82% of the total Internet traffic
will be generated by the distribution of video contents [1],
which are owned by over-the-top Content Providers (CPs) and
distributed to users connected thanks to an Internet Service
Provider (ISP).
To cope with VoD traffic growth, ISPs exploit network
caching to keep network-resource occupation low and to pro-
vide users with improved QoE (achieved by lowering retrieval
latency and congestion probability [2]). Using caching, por-
tions of CPs’ content catalogues (mainly popular contents) can
be served from locations closer to end-users (i.e., the caches).
Therefore, by establishing a subdivision of the available cache
storage capacity among the CPs, the ISP can significantly
affect the users’ QoE. Hence, caching can be regarded as a
form of discriminatory traffic prioritization and it has recently
emerged in the debate on Network Neutrality (NN) [3]–[5].
In brief, NN is the legislative principle according to which
ISPs are allowed to prioritize a class of traffic only based on its
performance requirements. For example, the traffic generated
by a VoIP call can be treated with higher priority with respect
to e-mail exchange, but not with respect to another call.
As far as caching is concerned, however, all the traffic is
generated by the same class of contents (e.g., video) and, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no current agreement on
the definition of NN-compliant caching. A possible view of
NN-compliant caching [3], [5] requires the ISP to reserve CPs
portions of storage proportional to their contents’ popularity.
A high-level representation of this concept is depicted in Fig.
1. An example of this type of subdivision, that we refer to
as popularity-driven, is the following: given a cache server
that can store an average number of 1000 contents, a CP that
owns 500 out the 1000 most requested contents from the users
of the ISP is assigned 50% of the available cache storage.
Consistently with our previous works [4], [5], we consider
the popularity-driven subdivision to be both NN-compliant
and effective. In fact, it is NN-compliant since it guarantees
the CPs a neutral treatment (because the storage is assigned
only based on their attractiveness and not on arbitrary forms
of agreement with the ISP), but also effective for the ISP,
that experiences the highest reduction of its network resource
occupation when the most popular contents are served directly
from its area. For a better understanding, we refer the reader
to Ref. [4], where we presented a numerical analysis on how
caching can be discriminatory towards the CPs.
On the other hand, compliance to such NN principles would
require the ISP to obtain information about contents’ popular-
ity, which is unlikely as CPs are increasingly encrypting their
contents to protect users’ privacy. To cope with this issue,
we propose a privacy-preserving protocol by which the ISP
can divide its cache storage proportionally to the popularities
of CPs’ contents. More specifically, the contributions of our
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Fig. 1. High-Level representation of the proposed idea of NN-compliant
caching: CPs are entitled to receive a portion of storage proportional to their
popularity
work are listed in the following.
• We propose a protocol based on the Shamir Secret
Sharing (SSS) scheme that is designed to protect both
CPs’ and ISP’s privacy requirements, as ISP and CPs
are not required to exchange with each other sensitive
information (e.g., the capacities of the caches and the
popularities of contents).
• We define an architecture suitable for the execution of the
protocol. This architecture is composed of an ISP, several
CPs and a regulator authority (RA), which ensures that
each CP is assigned a fair amount of storage and that no
illicit collusion occurs among CPs and ISP.
• We develop a discrete-event-based simulator for dynamic
VoD traffic provisioning, that we use to perform the com-
parison between the proposed protocol and two baseline
approaches, namely the (i) static and the (ii) network-
resource-driven subdivisions.
• We perform extensive simulations and measure the per-
formance of the various approaches in terms of the
network Resource Occupation (RO), measured by the
ISP, and the Hit-Rate measured by the ISP and CPs.
The obtained results show that our proposed protocol allows
minimizing network RO and maximizing the overall hit-ratio
with respect to baseline approaches and, unlike the baselines,
it also guarantees a NN-compliant storage subdivision. Finally,
we evaluate the overhead the protocol introduces, which may
be considered negligible compared to the reduction of RO that
the protocol provides.
A. Related Work
a) Network-Neutral Caching: Existing literature on NN
mainly focuses on legislative aspects [6] and technical ap-
proaches for monitoring its fulfillment [7], which is widely-
recognized as a rather difficult task. Along this line, it is often
argued (e.g., in [8]) that NN can be enforced only if network
management becomes more transparent to ISPs customers.
In this work, we propose a protocol that guarantees a fair
and transparent treatment to CPs that apply caching on an
ISP network. While research concerning regulations of NN-
compliant traffic prioritization is quite extensive and mature
[6], NN aspects of caching have been rarely considered. To
the best of our knowledge, caching has been considered as a
potentially-discriminatory process only in Ref. [3], [4], where
possible definitions of NN-compliant caching are proposed.
These works, however, do not propose any technical imple-
mentation for the enforcement of NN-compliant caching. Ref.
[4] observes that the enforcement of NN-compliant caching is
prevented by the wide adoption of encryption. In this work, we
focus on the technical implementation of a protocol that en-
ables the enforcement of NN-compliant caching. Specifically,
we extend our work in [5], in which we designed a protocol
that guarantees (i) NN compliance, (ii) scalability (e.g., with
respect to the number of CPs) and (iii) privacy (CPs and ISP
are not required to exchange sensitive information with each
other). The main limitations of the protocol in [5] are that the
available cache storage is not fully utilized and all the contents
are required to be of the same size. Both these limitations are
overcome in the extended version described in this paper.
b) Privacy-Preserving Caching: Ref. [9] proposes two
different approaches for ISPs to efficiently cache contents in
presence of encryption. In the first approach, the ISP infers
information about popularity by analyzing the occurrences
of pseudonomys associated with the contents and selects the
contents to be cached accordingly. In [10] it is observed that
this approach does not fully protect privacy, and guidelines
are provided to improve it. In [11], the ISP reserves a slice of
cache storage and leaves each CP manage independently its
slice remotely. To compute the slice of storage to allocate to
a CP, several approaches are proposed such as by localizing
the geographic distribution of requests in a privacy-preserving
fashion [12] or by analyzing the aggregate hit-rates experi-
enced by each CP [11]. In our protocol, however, we compute
the subdivision of the storage to be allocated to a CP meeting
more challenging privacy requirements (i.e., the ISP is not
required to obtain the hit-rate related to each CP) and, differ-
ently from [11], we guarantee that the ISP actually divides its
cache in a NN-fashion. To achieve this objective, we base our
protocol on consolidated cryptographic primitives, namely the
Paillier cryptosystem and the SSS scheme (explained in detail
in Section II). An in-depth description of schemes constructed
over SSS can be found in [13]–[15].
B. Paper Organization
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide
background on the building blocks of the proposed protocol.
A definition of NN-compliant caching, along with a formal
problem statement is presented in Section III. The entities
involved in the execution of the proposed protocol, their objec-
tives and the security assumptions are presented in Section IV.
Section V describes the proposed protocol. The simulations
settings and the event-driven simulator employed to perform
the experiments are described in Section VI. The obtained
results and the relative discussion are presented in Section
VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Paillier cryptosystem
Paillier [16] is a type of asymmetric cryptosystem, whose
public and private keys are referred in the rest of the paper
to as pubk and privk, respectively. Paillier has additive
homomorphic properties, i.e., the summation of two (or more)
cypertexts is the encryption of the summation of the rela-
tive plaintexts. For example, given two pairs of plaintexts
m1, m2 and the relative ciphertexts c1 = Enc(m1, pubk),
c2 = Enc(m2, pubk), it holds that m = Dec(c, privk), where
m = m1 +m2 and c = c1 + c2.
B. Shamir Secret Sharing
A (W,T ) Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) [17] is a crypto-
graphic scheme that allows to share a secret s among a set
of W participants in such a way that its reconstruction can
only be performed by the collusion of any subset of at least
T participants. In the rest of the paper, we use the notationJcKP to indicate the share of s assigned to the participant P .
The SSS is based on the principle that any polynomial
of degree T − 1 can be perfectly reconstructed from the
knowledge of T points that it intercepts. Let s ∈ Zq be the
secret (with q a prime number greater than all the possible
secrets) and let v1, v2, ..., vT−1 be the coefficients of the
polynomial, which are random integers uniformly distributed
in [0, q − 1]. The participant P receives JcKP = (xP , yP ),
with xP an integer number (distinct for each participant) and
yP = s+u1xP +u2x
2
P + ...+uT−1x
T−1
P . The reconstruction
of s can be performed by means of interpolation algorithms,
e.g., the Lagrange interpolation.
C. Protocol building blocks
During the execution of the protocol, the operations per-
formed over secrets shared with SSS are based on three main
atomic operators, namely the equality-test, the comparison
and the multiplication. The equality-test (resp., comparison)
operator takes as input the shares Js1K and Js2K and returnsJ1K if s1 = s2 (resp., s1 ≤ s2) and J0K otherwise. The
multiplication takes as input Js1K and Js2K and returns Js1·s2K.
As for the equality-test, we employ the equality-test without
bit decomposition described in [14]. The equality-test operator
serves as the main building block for the implementation
of the aggregate-if-equal algorithm [13], that takes in input
(Js1], Jv1]) and (Js2K, Jv2K), i.e., two pairs of (secret,value) in
secret shared form and returns (Js1], Jv1+v2K) and (Js2K, J0K)
if s1 = s2, whereas the pairs are left unchanged otherwise. In
our work, we employ another algorithm presented in [13] that
efficiently aggregates a sequence of M (secret,value) pairs in
secret shared form by recursively applying the aggregate-if-
equal algorithm for M logM times.
Our protocol requires to perform several multiplications of
secrets. However, the SSS is not homomorphic with respect
to the multiplication (i.e., given the shares of two secrets s1
and s2, Js1 · s2K 6= Js1K · Js2K). To address this issue, our
protocol exploits the multiplication scheme proposed in [18].
This scheme requires the parties involved in the multiplication
to share with each other a multiplicative triple JaK, JbK, JcK
such that a · b = c. The security of the multiplication scheme
described in [18] is based on the assumption that none of the
involved parties is able to obtain the secrets a, b, c from the
relative shares JaK, JbK, JcK. The shares of the multiplication
triple can be pre-computed in a secure manner using the
scheme proposed in [19].
III. NN-COMPLIANT CACHING
A. Definition
In Ref. [4] we advocated the inclusion of caching in the
current debate about NN and provided guidelines to reach a
possible definition of NN-compliant caching. In this work,
we consider caching to be network-neutral if the available
ISP’s cache storage is divided among the CPs proportionally
to the popularity of their contents. This definition allows to
balance the requirements of NN (i.e., CPs are treated based
on an unbiased criterion instead of on arbitrary forms of
agreements) and the legitimate interests of the ISP, which is
willing to minimize its network RO in return of the monetary
investment done to buy and maintain the caching system [20].
In the next subsection, we formally present the problem of
computing a popularity-driven subdivision of the storage and
we briefly introduce the protocol proposed to solve it in a
privacy-preserving manner.
B. Problem Statement
We consider a scenario where a sequence of N requests
R = {r1, r2, ..., rN} is issued from the users within the area
of an ISP towards a set of K CPs. The ISP owns a caching
system composed of several cache servers. The generic n-
th cache is characterized by the size of its storage S(n)cache,
expressed in bytes, and by an average number of contents
that it can store, i.e., N (n)cache. Assuming that the average size
of the contents is sˆ, it is possible to derive N (n)cache as N
(n)
cache =
bS
(n)
cache
sˆ c.
Following the definition of NN-compliant caching given in
Section III-A, the total storage of the n-th cache (i.e., S(n)cache)
should be divided among the K CPs proportionally to the
popularity of their contents. Specifically, if the n-th cache can
store, on average, N (n)cache contents, the k-th CP is entitled to
receive a percentage of the total storage proportional to the
number of its contents belonging to the N (n)cache most requested
contents from the area of the ISP. The portion of storage γ(n)k
that the k-th CP is worth receiving is computed as:
γ
(n)
k =
zk∑K
j=1 zj
· S(n)cache, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (1)
where S(n)cache is the size of the n-th cache, while zj is the
number of contents offered by the j-th CP whose popularity
rank is below N (n)cache (we recall that the most popular content
has rank equal to 0).
To compute γ(n)k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the ISP and the CPs
are required to exchange with each other information that
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are deemed confidential, such as the size of the caches
and the popularity of the contents. The protocol that we
propose allows to perform this computation in a privacy-
preserving manner. In the next Section, we describe the roles
and objectives of the entities involved in the execution of the
protocol.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
The proposed protocol is executed by three entities, namely
an ISP, the CPs and a Regulator Authority (RA). This Section
is devoted to the description of the involved parties, their
caching objectives, privacy requirements, and security models.
A. Internet Service Provider
The ISP provides Internet connectivity to its users and it
is the owner of the caching system exploited by the CPs.
Concerning the execution of our protocol, it has the following
objectives/requirements.
Caching Objectives: the main performance objective of
the ISP is the minimization of its overall network resource
occupation (RO). RO is defined as the amount of resources
occupied to deliver all requests (more specifically, RO is the
product of the number of network links traversed by the
duration of a request by the bit-rate of the requested content).
Privacy Requirements: ISPs commonly consider confiden-
tial the information related to their infrastructure [21]. In this
work, we assume that ISP is not willing to disclose the size
of its cache servers, as this may provide precious information
on its monetary investment [22]. More specifically, the RA
and all the K CPs should not learn any information about the
size of the n-th cache (i.e., S(n)cache). CPk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K can
learn, at most, a lower bound γ(n)k , which is obtained as a
licit output of the protocol. In addition, the RA should not
learn γ(n)k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Security Model: we model the ISP as an honest-but-
curious entity, that executes the protocol truthfully but tries
to obtain as many information as possible from its transcripts
(e.g., the ISP may try to infer the popularity of a content
from the secrets’ shares that it receives). A variation of the
protocol that can deal with a dishonest ISP (i.e., an ISP that
lies in its inputs) is described in Section V-F, where we present
a subprotocol managed by the RA to perform anti-cheating
operations.
B. Content Providers
We consider K CPs, referred to as CPk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
A generic CPk offers a catalogue of contents Ck, which
is assumed to be completely stored on a datacenter located
outside the area of the ISP. As proposed in [11], each
CP remotely manages its portion of cache storage (e.g., by
selecting the contents to be cached) and directly serves its
users from the cache. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the catalogues of the K CPs do not have any content
in common (i.e., single catalogues’ entries do not overlap).
Moreover, we assume that the catalogues of the K CPs are not
equally attractive towards the users, i.e., some catalogues are
much more popular than others [23] and that users can retrieve
contents from any of such catalogues. We refer to the overall
catalogue (i.e., the composition of all the CPs catalogues) to
as C.
Caching Objectives: a CP aims to maximize its personal
Hit-Rate (i.e., the percentage of requests directed to it that are
served from the caches), as this results in an improvement of
the overall QoE that it can offer to its users [2].
Privacy Requirements: we assume that the CPs aim to
protect the following information:
1) Confidentiality of the requests: given the generic request
r issued by user u toward CPk, the ISP, the RA and
all the CPs (except CPk itself) should not be able
to identify the requested content with non-neglibigle
probability.
2) Contents’ popularity: given two contents cx and cy , the
ISP, the RA and all the CPs should not be able to
say if cx is more popular than cy with non-negligible
probability. In case both cx and cy belong to the generic
CPk, only that CP can know which content is more
popular than the other. It is important to remark that
disclosing the information about contents’ popularity
would reveal extremely confidential insights about the
competition between the CPs (e.g., how the market
shares are distributed among the CPs).
3) Number of contents and their size: the ISP, the RA and
all the CPs should not be able to discover the total
number of contents owned by the CPs, as well as their
sizes.
Security Model: our protocol guarantees a popularity-
driven subdivision of the storage, but its effectiveness is based
on the assumption that CPs honestly execute it. In fact, if CPs
altered their data during the execution of the protocol (e.g.,
by lying about a requested content), the obtained subdivision
would not reflect the correct proportion among CPs’ popular-
ity. Driven by the idea that each CP has scarce knowledge
about the popularity patterns of the competitors, we assume
that it is also not able to alter its data in such a way to obtain
a portion of cache storage larger that what it is entitled to
receive. Moreover, we assume that the CPs do not have the
economical incentives to collude with each other. Hence, CPs
can be considered honest.
C. Regulator Authority
The Regulator Authority (RA) is considered a honest entity
that engages with the ISP and the CPs only the legitimate
exchange of information envisioned by the protocol. The
RA has the main objective of ensuring a NN-compliant
storage subdivision (i.e., popularity-driven) division and acts
as a guarantor that CPs’ and ISP’s privacy is not violated.
Moreover, the RA is the only entity that knows the private
key that can be used to decrypt the data ciphered with the
Paillier cryptosystem.
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Fig. 2. Phases of the execution of the NN-compliant protocol
V. THE NN-COMPLIANT PROTOCOL
The NN-compliant protocol involves a set of operations that
are mainly performed over the shares of the secrets that ISP,
CPs and RA generate using SSS and exchange among each
other. We consider a (2,2) SSS, i.e., only a collusion of 2 out
of 2 participants allows to reconstruct the secrets.
The protocol works in four main phases: preliminary op-
erations, share collection, operations on shares and caching.
The preliminary operations are needed to make the parties
learn data (e.g., the shares of the multiplication triples) that
will be needed during the execution of the protocol. Hence,
such operations can be performed in an off-line fashion. The
successive three phases last for a period of Tcol, Top and
Tcaching , respectively, and are cyclically repeated as depicted
in Figure 2. In the same figure it is also possible to notice that
the share collection and the operations on shares phases start
simultaneously after the end of the previous share collection
phase and that, by construction, Tcol = Tcaching . We describe
the aforementioned phases in the following subsections.
A. Preliminary operations
Preliminary operation aim is to give the ISP the information
on the average size of CPs’ contents and to compute the
shares of the multiplication triples required to perform secret
multiplications.
1) Secure Computation of the Average Dimension of the
Contents: First, the ISP learns sˆ, i.e., the average size of
the contents owned by the CPs. This value is needed to
obtain the average number of contents that a cache can store
(i.e., Ncache) from its size Scache (see Eq. 1). This phase is
designed to allow the CPs to not disclose to the ISP neither
the number nor the size of their contents. The k-th CP uses
the public key pubk to encrypt (i) the sum of the sizes of its
contents (i.e., Sk) and (ii) the number of contents of its cata-
logue (i.e., Nk) by means of the Paillier cryptosystem briefly
reviewed in Section II-A. Both Enc(Sk) and Enc(Nk) are
sent to the RA. This operation is performed by all the K CPs.
Then, the RA computes
∑K
k=1Enc(Nk) and
∑K
k=1Enc(Sk)
that, due to the additive homomorphic properties of the Paillier
cryptosystem, correspond to the encryption of the total number
of contents and to the overall summation of their sizes,
respectively. The RA, which is assumed to be the only entity
who knows the private key privk, successively decrypts the
two values and obtain
∑K
k=1Nk and
∑K
k=1 Sk. From these
values, it is then simple to compute the average size of the
Fig. 3. Secure computation of the average contents’ size
contents as sˆ =
∑K
k=1 Sk∑K
k=1Nk
, which is sent by the RA to the ISP.
A representation of this phase is depicted in Fig. 3.
2) Secure Computation of a Multiplication Triple: The ISP
and the RA compute the shares of a multiplicative triple
(JaKISP , JaKRA,JbKISP , JbKRA,JcKISP , JcKRA such that c =
a · b) by means of the scheme presented in [19] and briefly
reviewed in Section II.
B. Collection of the shares
Upon a new request (say ri) for content cj ∈ C, the owner
CP generates two shares of the identifier (e.g., the name) of
content cj , i.e., JriKISP = JcjKISP and JriKRA = JcjKRA, and
sends them to the ISP and the RA, respectively. We assume
that the ISP and the RA can always associate a share with
the owner CP (e.g., by means of its IP address). At the end
of this phase, the ISP and the RA know the shares of all
the requests R issued during the share collection phase, i.e.,
SISP = {JriKISP } and SRA = {JriKRA}, ∀ri ∈ R. Notice
that, even if the same content cj is requested in both r1 and
r2, it holds that Jr1K 6= Jr2K, which prevents the ISP from
inferring the popularity patterns of the CPs. The operations
performed in this phase are shown in Subprotocol 1.
Subprotocol 1 Collecting the shares of the requested contents’
identifiers
Input: RA: None
ISP: None
CPs: Each CPk inputs the subset of contents’ requests
R = {r1, ..., rN} directed to it
Output: RA learns JriKRA, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
ISP learns JriKISP , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
CPs learn nothing
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
2: Let CPk be the owner of the content requested in ri
3: CPk generates JriKISP and JriKRA
4: CPk → RA: JriKRA
5: CPk → ISP: JriKISP
6: end for
C. Operations on shares
Since the ISP and the RA perform the same operations on
their set of shares, we omit the apex unless necessary and
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we describe the operations performed over the abstract set of
shares S = {JriK,∀ri ∈ R} that have been collected during
the collection phase. The operations performed over the shares
are shown in Subprotocol 2 and described in the following:
Subprotocol 2 Performing operations on the shares
Input: RA: JriKRA, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
ISP: JriKISP , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Output: RA learns JzkKRA, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
ISP learns JzkKISP , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
1: RA generates two shares of the constant 1: J1KRA andJ1KISP
2: ISP generates two shares of the constant Ncache:JNcacheKRA and JNcacheKISP
3: RA → ISP: J1KISP
4: ISP → RA: JNcacheKRA
RA and ISP locally execute for j=RA and j=ISP, respec-
tively
1: Execute the aggregate-if-equal algorithm over the set
{(JriKj , J1Kj) , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and obtain {JniKj , 1 ≤ i ≤
N}
2: Execute the comparison algorithm between all the pairs
of elements of the set {JniKj , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and obtain
{JpiiKj , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
4: Execute the comparison algorithm on
(JpiiKj , JNcacheKj) and obtain JβiKj
5: The CPk to which ri is directed is identified
6: Updating of the number of contents belonging to CPk
whose popularity rank pi < Ncache :JzkKj ← JzkKj + JβiKj
7: end for
1) Aggregate if equal: Given a set S = {JriK,∀i ∈ R}
containing the shares relative to the contents of N requests,
the objective of this phase is to obtain the share JniK,∀i ∈
{1, ..., N}, where ni is total number of requests of the content
requested in ri. To perform this operation, we employ the
algorithm presented in [13] and briefly reviewed in Section
II, that computes the aggregation of a set of N elements (in
the form of secret shares of key and value) by recursively
executing the aggregate-if-equal algorithm N logN times. In
our application of the protocol, the key is the share of the
content cj hidden in the i-th request ri, i.e., JriK = JcjK, while
the value associated is the share of 1 for all the requests. Since
both the ISP and the CPs might be interested in altering the
value (as this would favour some contents over others and
ultimately affect the caching process), we mandate the RA to
generate J1KRA and J1KISP at each request. At the end of
this phase, the ISP and the RA obtain the respective shares ofJniK,∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
2) Rank computation: From the previous phase, ISP and
RA have obtained a set JniK,∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} containing
the shares of the number of occurrences for each requested
content. With these data in hand, they aim at computing
ISP
CPk
Aggregation of Shares if equal
Rank computation
Portion of storage computation 
𝑟𝑖 𝐼𝑆𝑃 𝑟𝑖 𝑅𝐴
𝑁𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝐴1 𝐼𝑆𝑃
𝑟𝑖 𝐼𝑆𝑃 𝑟𝑖 𝑅𝐴
RA
γ𝑘 𝐼𝑆𝑃 γ𝑘 𝑅𝐴
Share Collection / Operations on Shares / Caching
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝐴
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ 𝑧𝑘 ⋅ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑆𝑃
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ ∑𝑧𝑗 𝐼𝑆𝑃
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ ∑𝑧𝑗 𝑅𝐴
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ 𝑧𝑘 ⋅ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝐴
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ ∑𝑧𝑗 𝑅𝐴
𝑟𝑣 ⋅ 𝑧𝑘 ⋅ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝐴
Fig. 4. Main shares learnt by ISP, CPs and RA during the execution of the
NN-compliant protocol
pii ∈ [0, N − 1], i.e., the rank of the content requested
in ri, where pii increases with decreasing popularity of the
associated content (i.e., pi = 0 for the most popular content).
To perform this task, all the shares JniK,∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
need to be compared with each other, for a total of N2
executions of the comparison algorithm mentioned in Section
II. We recall that the algorithm takes in input two shares Jx1K
and Jx2K and returns J1K if x1 ≤ x2, and J0K otherwise.
Considering that J1K = 1 − J0K and J0K = 1 − J1K (due to
the additive homomorphic properties of SSS), it is possible
to assign the share J1K to the lower value (say x1) and the
share J0K to the higher one (say x2) with a single execution of
the comparison algorithm. Hence, the complexity is reduced
from N2 to
(
N
2
)
executions of the comparison algorithm.
The rank pii can then be computed by summing up the
results, in secret shared form, of the relative comparisons asJpiiK = ∑N−1x=1,x6=iJli,xK, where li,x = 0 if ni ≤ nx (and
1 otherwise). Notice that, if ri is the request relative to the
most popular content, then li,x = 0, ∀x (because its number
of occurrences is higher than all the others) and, as expected,
pii = 0.
Once the shares of ranks JpiiK,∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} have been
obtained, ISP and RA need to compute the share of the portion
of cache that each CP is expected to receive. To this aim,
the rank of each content needs to be compared with the size
of the cache and, if pii ≤ Ncache, the CP to which ri is
directed is entitled to store one content. Since the ISP wants
to protect the information about its cache size, it generates 2
shares JNcacheKISP and JNcacheKRA, which can be used to
perform a comparison with JpiiK,∀i ∈ [1, ..., N ] by means of
the comparison algorithm. The result of the i-th comparison
is JβiK, with βi = 1 if pii ≤ Ncache (and 0 otherwise).
By repeating this operation for all the requests directed
towards CPk, i.e., Rk, ISP and RA obtain the share of
the number of most popular contents owned by CPk asJzk] =∑i∈RkJβiK.
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D. Caching
Subprotocol 3 Calculating the portion of cache storage to
allocate to each CP
Input: RA: JScacheKRA, JzkKRA, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
ISP: JScacheKISP , JzkKISP , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
CPs: None
Output: RA learns nothing
ISP learns γk = rv·zk·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
Each CPk learns γk = rv·zk·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
1: ISP and RA compute the shares JrvKISP and JrvKRA of
a secret random integer rv using the scheme of [14]
2: ISP and RA compute Jrv · ∑Kj=1 zjKISP andJrv · ∑Kj=1 zjKRA using the multiplication protocol
of [18]
3: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
4: RA → CPk: Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA
5: ISP computes Jrv · zk · ScacheKISP
6: RA computes Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA
7: RA → CPk: Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA
8: end for
9: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
10: CPk → ISP: Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA and Jrv ·zk ·ScacheKRA
11: ISP→ CPk: Jrv·∑Kj=1 zjKISP and Jrv·zk ·ScacheKISP
12: end for
13: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
14: ISP and CPk reconstruct the secret rv ·
∑K
j=1 zj ←(Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA, Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKISP)
15: ISP and CPk reconstruct the secret rv · zk · Scache ←
(Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA, Jrv · zk · ScacheKISP )
16: end for
17: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
18: ISP computes γk = rv·zk·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
19: CPk computes γk = rv·zk·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
20: end for
We remind that CPk is entitled to receive a portion of
storage γk = zk∑K
j=1 zj
· Scache. The ISP and the RA know
their shares JScacheK and JzkK, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and could recover
zk,
∑K
j=1 zj and Scache and obtain from them the value γk.
The exchange of shares and the operations performed on them
to compute the cache storage subdivision are described in the
following and shown in Subprotocol 3.
However, we prevent the ISP and the RA from directly
reconstructing these secrets since (i) from
∑K
j=1 zj the RA
could obtain a good estimate of the size of the cache Scache
and (ii) from zk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K it would discover the number
of contents owned by each CP whose popularity rank is less
than Nc. Instead, ISP and RA employ the scheme described
in [14] to obtain the shares of a random integer JrvKISP andJrvKRA without learning rv itself. With these values in hands,
they then learn, using the multiplicative protocol proposed
in [18], Jrv · zk · ScacheK, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjK.
Notice that these values represent the shares of the numerator
and denominator of zk∑K
j=1 zj
, respectively, which have been
masked with the same value rv to keep the ratio between
them unchanged (and equal to γk).
Then, the RA sends Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA and Jrv ·∑K
j=1 zjKRA to the corresponding k-th CP, which exchanges
with the ISP their shares to recover rv · zk · Scache and
rv ·∑Kj=1 zj . From these two reconstructed secrets, both the
ISP and the k-th CP compute the amount of storage destined
to CPk:
γk =
rv · zk · Scache
rv ·∑Kj=1 zj (2)
Notice that the k-th CP learns nothing more that its allo-
cated storage. For example, it does not learn the percentage
of storage it is assigned, from which it would have derived
the size of the cache Scache.
At this point, the k-th CP can start caching its contents
in the received storage portion. Notice also that, whilst the
popularity-based caches subdivision is computed by perform-
ing operations on the shares relative to contents requests (i.e.,
the proposed protocol is designed to work at the content level)
caching strategies are successively applied by the CPs on a
chunk-level basis, as further described in Section VI-A. In
Fig. 4 we depict the most salient shares that the involved
parties exchange with each other during the last three phases
of execution of the protocol, namely collection of shares,
operations on shares and caching.
E. Fullfilment of Privacy Requirements
1) ISP’s Privacy Requirements: We remind that neither the
RA nor the CPs are allowed to obtain the size of the ISP’s
caches (i.e., Scache) and that the RA is not allowed to obtain
the portion of storage given to CPk, i.e., γk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
During the execution of the protocol (in the rank compu-
tation phase, precisely) the RA obtains the share JNcacheK.
Since SSS is proved secure under the information-theoretic
security model [17], this share provides absolutely no addi-
tional information on the relative secret. Hence, the RA does
not discover the size of the cache. Then, in the caching phase,
the RA learns Jrv · zk ·ScacheK and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjK. Under the
assumption of honest RA, ISP and RA do not exchange their
shares with each other. Hence, the RA does not obtain γk.
During the caching phase, CPk, , 1 ≤ k ≤ K learns rv ·
zk · Scache and rv ·
∑K
j=1 zj , from which it computes γk =
rv·zk·Scache
rv·∑Kj=1 zj . Notice that the ability of CPk to estimate Scache
is bounded by its ability to assess its popularity with respect
to the popularity of its competitors, which is encoded in the
ratio zk∑K
j=1 zj
. Since we have assumed that each CP has scarse
knowledge about other CPs’ attractiveness, we consider Scache
to be protected from the CPs as well.
2) CP’s Privacy Requirements: Considering the first pri-
vacy requirement of the CP, i.e., the confidentiality of the
requests, in the share collection phase the ISP and the RA
receive JriKISP and JriKRA from the CP towards which the
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i-th request is issued (say CPk). As SSS is information-
theoretically secure, it holds that:
P (cj |JriK) = 1Nk , ∀j ∈ {1, ...,Nk} (3)
where P (cj |JriK) is the probability that the share JriK refers
to content cj and Nk is the total number of contents owned by
CPk. No CP (except CPk) obtains JriK from the execution
of the protocol and both the RA and the ISP can identify
the content hidden behind the i-th request with a negligible
probability only. Hence, the first CPs’ privacy requirement is
fulfilled.
Concerning the second privacy requirement, i.e., protection
of contents’ popularity, in the rank computation phase the ISP
and the RA obtain the shares of the number of occurrences
of the content hidden behind the i-th request, i.e., JniK, ∀i.
They then compare the number of occurrences of each pair
of contents (say ci and cx) and obtain the result in secret
shared form (i.e., Jli,xK). Due to the information-theoretically
security properties of SSS, P (li,x = 0) = P (li,x = 1) = 0.5.
Hence, neither the ISP nor the RA can violate the privacy of
contents’ popularity.
Finally, to satisfy the third privacy requirement, the ISP
should not obtain the number and the sizes’ of CPs’ contents.
During the preliminary operations, the ISP only obtains the
average size of contents sˆ, from which it cannot derive neither
the total number of contents, nor their sizes.
F. Extension of the Protocol for dishonest ISP
In this Section, we describe a scenario in which, by
maliciously forging its data, the ISP can obtain an unfair
subdivision of the cache storage. We then provide an extension
of the protocol to make the RA able to discover if the ISP is
cheating.
The generic cache server is characterized by its size Scache
and by the average number of contents that it can store Ncache,
according to the relation Scache = Ncache · sˆ, being sˆ the
average size of CPs’ contents. Nc determines the number of
contents that the CPs regard as the most popular ones. Just
as an example, let us think of the case of 2 CPs, referred
to as CP1 and CP2, which own contents whose popularity
ranks go from 0 to 49 and from 50 to 99, respectively. If
Ncache = 50 contents, then, according to our definition of
NN-compliant caching, the 100% of the total cache storage
should be assigned to CP1. This value drops to 50% if,
instead, Ncache = 100 contents. This scenario shows that, by
communicating to the RA the share of a forged Ncache, the
ISP is able favour a specific CP. To address this issue, the RA
can compare sˆ · JNcKRA and JScKRA using the equality-test
operator, and ask the ISP to perform a similar operation. By
doing so, RA and ISP learn the shares JbeqKRA and JbeqKISP ,
from which they recover beq that is equal to 1 if the ISP did
not forged Ncache, and 0 otherwise.
Fig. 5. Schematic representation of the ISP Network Topology and the
location of caches.
VI. DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS FOR VOD CONTENT
CACHING AND DISTRIBUTION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-
preserving network-neutrality compliant caching protocol, we
develop a discrete-event-driven simulator to perform dynamic
simulations of VoD content caching and distribution. In this
section, we describe the developed simulator, the VoD request
provisioning process and the general simulation settings.
A. Dynamic VoD Content Caching and Distribution Simulator
The overall framework of the simulator is described as
follows: Given the network topology, content catalogue char-
acteristics of each CP, locations of caches and the list of stored
contents per CP in each cache, the simulator provisions the
dynamically-arriving VoD-content requests, based on current
network status, and gives as an output the overall amount of
resources occupied to provision contents of a specific CP, the
overall RO of the network and caches’ hit-ratios.
Note that a VoD-content request is provisioned taking
into consideration its chunk-nature, i.e., each VoD request,
according to its duration, consists of a number of chunks
and the chunks are provisioned sequentially. This allows to
have different chunks of the same VoD request delivered from
different caches, which is basically the case when caches are
dynamically updated, i.e., when contents are pulled out from
or pushed in caches. Specifically, a VoD-chunk request is
described by the tuple r = (tr, Dr, br, m, dr), where tr is
the request arriving time from node Dr, br is the requested
bit-rate, m is the requested content and dr is the chunk du-
ration. The simulated VoD-chunk provisioning/deprovisioning
process is described as follows: Upon arrival of a VoD-chunk
request for content m from node Dr, a list of all cache nodes
hosting m (including the video server) is identified. Then, the
nearest cache storing content m delivers the chunk to node
Dr, considering a path with available bandwidth greater than
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TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Protocol’s variables and relative description Simulation settings’s Variables and relative description
Variable Description Variable Description
ri i-th request issued from users N Total number of contents’ requests
R = {ri} Set of all the requests M Total number of available contentsJxK Share of the generic value x Nk Number of contents of CPk’s catalogue
ni
Number of requests for the content
hidden behind the i-th request Sk
Sum of the sizes (measured in bytes)
of the CPk’s contents
pii
Popularity rank of the content
hidden behind the i-th request sˆ
Average size (measured in bytes)
of the M available contents
zk
Number of contents belonging to CPk
whose popularity rank is below Ncache
N
(n)
cache
Capacity of the generic n-th ISP’s
cache (measured as the average number
of contents that can be stored on it)
γk
Amount of cache storage allocated
to CPk (measured in bytes)
S
(n)
cache
Capacity of the generic n-th ISP’s
cache (measured in bytes)
a, b, c|c = a · b Multiplicative triple securelyshared during the preliminary operations α
Skewness parameter of the
contents’ popularity distribution
pubkey , privkey
Public and private keys used to
securely compute the average contents’ size φ Bit-length representation of a share
or equal to br. The chunk is later deprovisioned at time ts+dr
deallocating the assigned bandwidth from the utilized path.
B. Network Model and Caching System
We consider a real ISP metro-aggregation network topology,
depicted in Fig. 5. The network consists of three types of
nodes, namely metro-core backbone nodes, metro-core nodes
and metro-aggregation nodes. We assume that the metro-core
and metro-aggregation nodes are cache-enabled nodes, i.e.,
capable of hosting and delivering video contents while the
metro-core backbone nodes are routers connecting the ISP to
the Internet. As for the cache-enabled nodes, we considered 2
metro-core and 12 metro-aggregation caches whose locations
are highlighted in Fig. 5.
C. Traffic Model
Information about contents’ requests is widely considered
sensitive and business relevant by CPs. Hence, public data sets
are rarely available to the research community and we had
to perform our simulations over synthetic traffic traces, which
have been crafted as follows. Based on a common assumption
made in the literature, we consider a fixed catalogue [24] of
contents whose popularities are distributed according to the
Zipf law, i.e., pj = j
−α∑M−1
z=0 pz
,∀j ∈ {0, ...,M − 1}, where pj
is the probability that the j-th popular content is chosen among
the available M videos. α ∈ [0, 1] is the skew parameter of the
Zipf (the number of scarcely-requested contents increases with
increasing α). Inspired by [25], we also introduce a temporal
dynamic to this popularity distribution. In particular, every
30 minutes we sum (or subtract, with the same probability) a
Poisson-distributed random variable (with mean value 1) to the
popularity rank of each content cj ,∀j ∈ {0, ...,M−1}. Notice
that the described catalogue results from the aggregation of
the single catalogues owned by each CP.
Finally, we consider CPs that offer, on average, contents
of significantly different popularities. Although being a well-
known characteristic of existing CPs (few of which are much
more popular than the others), to our knowledge a contents’
popularity model that take this fact into consideration has
never been proposed in the literature. To fill this gap, we
propose a model that is descibed in the following. We assume
that the k-th CP is characterized by a gaussian probability
distribution ρ(k)j over the ranks of the overall catalogue with
mean value µk = MK · (k − 12 ) and standard deviation
σk = σ1 + (K − k) · σ2−σ1K , where M and K are the
total number of contents and of CPs, respectively. σ1 and
σ2 are tuned to obtain different degrees of CPs’ popularity,
in particular to model the difference of CPs’ attractiveness
towards the users. To this aim, in Section VII we consider
scenarios with different values of σ1 and σ2.
According to the proposed model, the j-th popular content
of the overall catalogue described above belongs to the k-
th CP with probability P (j, k) =
ρ
(k)
j∑K
x=1 ρ
(x)
j
. In this way, for
example, given K = 5 CPs and M = 25000 contents and
considering σ1 = MK and σ2 =
σ1
K , CP1 and CP5 are assigned
contents with an average rank of 4369 and 22144, and standard
deviations of 3348 and 1946, respectively. This makes the
contents offered by CP5 much less popular than those owned
by CP1, on average.
We assume that the duration of the contents is a random
variable distributed according to a Pareto distribution with
skew parameter equal to 0.25. All the durations are then
normalized between 1200 s and 8400 s. We then assume the
same bit-representation for all the contents to be equal to 12
Mbits (hence contents have a size that ranges between 1.8 and
12.6 Gbytes).
VII. ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIVE RESULTS
A. Simulation Settings
In our experiments, we consider three approaches of
cache storage subdivision, namely the popularity-driven, the
resource-occupation-driven and the static subdivisions. In the
first approach, which is enabled by the use of our protocol,
each CP receives a portion of storage proportional to the
popularity of its contents. In the second approach each CP
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(a) Comparison of the RO considering a scenario with 5 CPs with
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(b) Comparison of the RO considering a scenario with 10 CPs with
an average number of 5000 contents
Fig. 6. Resource Occupation vs Tcol obtained with the popularity-driven and with the resource-occupation-driven subdivisions divided by the RO achieved
with the static subdivision.
receives a portion of storage proportional to the RO the the
delivery of its contents generates within the network of the
ISP. In the third approach, all the CPs receive the same amount
of storage.
To compare the performance of these approaches, we per-
form simulations on two different scenarios, the first char-
acterized by K = 5 CPs and Mˆ = 5000, and the second
by K = 10 CPs and Mˆ = 5000, for values of Tcol ∈
{10, 20, 30, ..., 100} minutes. In each simulation, we simulate
the arrival of 43000 VoD requests generated according to the
traffic model described in Sec. VI-C at an arrival rate guar-
anteeing negligible blocking probability (i.e., Zipf α = 0.8
and λ = 1req/sec), to provide a fair comparative analysis
between the considered approaches. We assume the network
topology shown in Fig. 5 with cache locations highlighted.
We fix the size of caches located at metro-aggregation nodes
and those located at metro-core nodes to 5% and 10% of the
overall content catalogues size (of all content catalogues of
all CPs).
B. Discussion
1) ISP’s Resource Occupation and Caching Hit-Rate: In
this section, we show the comparison of popularity-driven,
resource-occupation-driven and static subdivisions considering
the overall network RO and the Hit-Rate measured by the ISP
for increasing Tcol.
First, we depict the RO obtained with the former approaches
as a percentage of the RO measured when the static sub-
division is enforced (which is equal to ∼ 760 · 106Mbit if
K = 5 CPs and ∼ 713 · 106Mbit if K = 10 CPs). The
RO
ROstatic
as a function of Tcol is depicted in Fig. 6(a) and
Fig. 6(b), for the scenarios with 5 and 10 CPs, respectively.
We remind that an approach is preferable to the ISP if it
reduces the RO measured within its network. We note that
both the popularity-driven and the resource-occupation-driven
subdivision lead to a remarkable RO gain with respect to the
static subdivision. In both the scenarios under analysis, the
minimum RO is obtained when the storage of the caches is
divided according to the popularity-driven subdivision. More
specifically, the minimum RO is obtained with Tcol = 10
minutes and at Tcol = 50 minutes when 5 CPs and 10
CPs are considered, respectively. This result confirms that
the effectiveness of caching highly depends on information
about contents’ popularity and motivates the adoption of our
protocol as a tool to keep this information private.
In general, we observe a RO increase for increasing Tcol.
This fact can be explained considering that high values of
Tcol allow the ISP to obtain more information (e.g., about
contents’ popularity), but, at the same time, increases the
number of changes that contents’ popularity undergo during
Tcol. This increase is much more evident in the popularity-
driven subdivision, with such percentage going from ∼ 50.9%
to ∼ 53% when Tcol passes from 10 to 100 minutes, whereas
the percentage increases only slightly and it is mostly stable
around ∼ 51% when the resource-occupation-driven subdivi-
sion is employed. This difference between the two approaches
is due to fact that our protocol introduces a delay between the
computation of the popularity-driven subdivision and its actual
enforcement. This delay increases with increasing Tcol and
this may make the computed storage subdivision out-of-date
with respect to the current popularity patterns (we elaborate
further on the dependency between this delay and Tcol in
Section VII-B3). The conflicting effects of increasing Tcol are
more visible in Fig. 6(a), where it is possible to observe that
the RO of the popularity-driven subdivision decreases until the
minimum value is reached (at Tcol = 50 minutes) and then
increases up to the maximum (at Tcol = 100 minutes).
Fig. 7 shows the Hit-Rates measured at the caches located
in the metro-aggregation level (i.e., the percentage of requests
served from the caches closer to the users). Obtained results
are consistent with the RO previously described: (i) the
Hit-Rates of popularity-driven and resource-occupation-driven
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subdivisions significantly outperform the static subdivision
and (ii) the RO decreases (resp., increases) when the Hit-
Rate increases (resp., decreases). The maximum Hit-Rates
obtained with a popularity-driven subdivision are higher than
the benchmarks in both scenarios. For example, in the scenario
with 5 CPs, the maximum Hit-Rates for the popularity-
driven and for the resource-driven subdivision are ∼ 0.45 and
∼ 0.44, respectively (see Fig. 7(a)). When instead 10 CPs are
considered, the corresponding values are ∼ 0.436 and ∼ 0.428
(see Fig. 7(b)).
2) Hit-Rates for the CPs: According to our vision of NN an
ISP should maximally benefit from the application of caching
strategies, as long as they are not discriminatory towards the
CPs. Therefore, we believe that the ISP is entitled to decide
how frequenty the protocol is executed (i.e., by setting Tcol
to the value that minimizes the RO). However, since the
value that minimizes the RO is not necessarily the one that
maximizes the hit-ratio of every CP, CPs may experience a
loss in their hit-ratio. We formally define this loss as:
Lk =
hˆ(k) − hˆ(k)isp
hˆ(k)
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (4)
where hˆ(k) is the maximum Hit-Rate that the k-th CP would
obtain if it selfishly selected Tcol, while hˆ
(k)
isp is the Hit-Rate
that it actually experiences according to the decision taken
by the ISP. Notice that such hit-rates refer to the cumulative
hit-rates of metro-aggregation and metro-core caches (i.e., it
is the overall percentage of requests that the CPs serve from
the area of the ISP).
In Tab. II, we show the loss for each CPs of the first
scenario described in the previous Section (5 CPs with an
average number of contents of 5000 and contents’ popularity
distributed as shown in Fig. 8(a)). We notice that the loss
highly varies among the CPs that, in this scenario, offer
contents of significantly different popularities (e.g., CP1’s
contents are much more popular, on average, than CP5’s
contents). For instance, the loss goes from a minimum of
∼ 0.5% to a maximum of ∼ 27.6%, which are experienced by
CP1 and CP5 (the CP with the most and the least catalogues
on average, respectively). In the considered scenario, there is
a clear difference of popularity among the CPs. To understand
the impact that popularity difference has on the loss, we
perform additional simulations on a second scenario in which
the contents’ popularity is much more similar among the CPs.
Also in this second scenario there are 5 CPs offering, on
average, 5000 contents. The distribution of contents’ popu-
larity is derived setting σ1 = σ2 = 15000 and it is depicted
in Fig. 8(b). The loss of each CP in this second scenario is
presented in Tab. III, from which we can observe that the loss
goes from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 1.65% and
it is therefore much less significant than in the previous case.
From this comparison, it becomes evident that the difference
in CPs’ popularity highly affects the loss experienced by the
CPs. This can be explained considering that the hit-ratios of
the CPs do not significantly vary with changing the storage
TABLE II
LOSS OF CPS’ HIT-RATES WHEN CPS OFFER CONTENTS WITH
SIGNIFICANTLY-DIFFERENT POPULARITY
CPs Hisp Hcps Loss
CP1 0.807 0.811 0.499%
CP2 0.537 0.556 3.252%
CP3 0.147 0.171 14.104%
CP4 0.081 0.084 4.09%
CP5 0.068 0.094 27.64%
TABLE III
LOSS OF CPS’ HIT-RATES WHEN CPS OFFER CONTENTS WITH SIMILAR
POPULARITY
CPs Hisp Hcps Loss
CP1 0.659 0.67 1.65%
CP2 0.615 0.617 0.31%
CP3 0.596 0.596 0.03%
CP4 0.597 0.597 0%
CP5 0.533 0.533 0%
subdivision (as a result of tuning Tcol) if the CPs cache
contents with similar popularity. Hence, the hit-ratios of the
single CPs do not strongly depend on Tcol (i.e., the hit-ratios
are similar and close to the optimum one regardless the Tcol
chosen by the ISP). We therefore conclude that the CPs are
strongly penalized by being inhibited to select Tcol only if
their attractiveness towards the users is significantly different.
3) Complexity of the protocol and volume of the exchanged
data: We now provide an evaluation of the data overhead
introduced in all the phases of the execution of the protocol,
as well as the time needed to perform them.
The secure computation of the average size of CPs’ con-
tents’ sˆ is the only operation executed with our protocol that
does not require the use of SSS. The k-th CP 1 ≤ k ≤ K
sends to the RA the values of its number of contents Nk
and the overall size of its catalogue Sk encrypted using the
Paillier cryptosystem. Then, the RA decrypts these values
and communicates to the ISP the ratio between them, i.e.,
sˆ =
∑K
k=1 Sk∑K
k=1Nk
. This operation requires the exchange of 2K
messages between the CPs and the RA, and the exchange of
one piece of data between the RA and the ISP. As all such data
have negligible size (i.e., in the order of the hundreds of bits)
and their computation is not time-consuming, the introduced
TABLE IV
OVERHEAD OF DATA EXCHANGED DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE
PROTOCOL (BEING φ THE BIT-LENGTH REPRESENTATION OF THE SHARES
EXCHANGED AMONG THE PARTIES)
ISP RA CPs
ISP 0
(
N !
(N−2)!2! +N
)
· 9φ2
+N logN · 7φ2
+ 14φ
4Kφ
RA
(
N !
(N−2)!2! +N
)
· 9φ2
+N logN · 7φ2
+Nφ+ 14φ
0 2Kφ
CPs Nφ+ 3Kφ Nφ 0
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Fig. 7. ISP’s Hit-Rate (measured at metro-aggregation caches) vs Tcol obtained with the popularity-driven, the resource-occupation-driven and the static
subdivisions.
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Fig. 8. Global popularity of the contents VS Popularity of the contents within the catalogue of the owner CP
time and data overhead can be considered negligible.
Let us now consider all the remaining operations, which
are based on SSS. We refer to φ = b(log2 q + 1)c to indicate
the bit-length representation of a share ∈ Zq . The secure
computation of the multiplication triple (JaK, JbK, JcK such that
c = a · b) requires the ISP and the RA to exchange 4φ
bit (to obtain JaK, JbK in a distributed manner) and other 6φ
to obtain JcK. The reader is referred to [19] for an in-depth
understanding of all the required exchanges.
The collections of the shares relative to N requests issued
during Tcol requires the following exchange of data: 2Nφ
(to account for the shares sent by the CPs to the ISP and
the RA) and Nφ for the shares of 1s sent from the RA
to the ISP (to account for the value associated with each
request). The next phase requires N logN equality tests to
perform the aggregation of the collected shares and
(
N
2
)
+N
comparison operations to compute the ranks of the contents
and to compare them with the size of the cache. Each equality
operation requires the exchange of 2φ2 (which need to be
exchanged during the execution of the protocol, i.e., online)
and 12φ2 (which can be pre-computed and transmitted before
the execution of the protocol, i.e., offline) bits, while the
comparison operation requires 18φ2 bits exchanged on-line
[14].
Then, the ISP and the RA compute the random value rv in
a secure and distributed fashion and use it to obtain Jrv · zk ·
ScK and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjK. This operations require the exchange
of 18φ (2φ for the computation of rv and 16φ needed for
the multiplications). Successively, the RA sends the obtained
shares Jrv · zk · ScKRA and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA to the K CPs,
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Fig. 9. Time needed to perform the operations on the shares vs Period of
collection of the shares (an arrival rate λ = 1req/s is considered)
which requires 2Kφ additional transmitted bit. Finally, the
ISP exchanges with the CPs their shares to obtain γk, and
this results in an additional exchange of 4Kφ bits. In Table
IV, we show the amount of data (in bits) exchanged by the
three entities in a round of execution of the protocol.
From these considerations, it results that the additional time
overhead Top is given by the following formula:
Top = N logN · τeq +
(
N !
(N − 2)!2! +N
)
· τcomp (5)
Where τeq and τcomp refer to the time required to perform
an equality and a comparison operation, respectively. By
discarding the operations that can be performed offline, we
obtained τeq ' 0.47ms and τcomp = 0.68ms on a Intel Core
I7 computer. A representation of the time overhead needed to
perform operations on the shares (i.e., Top) as a function of
Tcol is depicted in Fig. 9.
Concerning the overhead introduced by the execution of
the protocol, the volume of data exchanged with the CPs can
be considered negligible. Conversely, the overhead of data
exchanged between ISP and RA grows quadratically with the
number of requests issued during the collection phase and
with the bit-length representation of the shares (i.e., φ). With
φ = 13 bits, it is possible to generate unique shares during a
collection phase that lasts up to 135 minutes, considering an
arrival rate of 1req/s. With these parameters, we obtain an
overhead of ' 2.2Gb online and ' 5Mb offline considering
Tcol = 80 minutes. This overhead drops to ' 1.2Gb when
Tcol = 60 minutes and to ' 138Mb when Tcol = 20 minutes.
This overhead is acceptable, especially considering the traffic
reduction achievable by the ISP. Remarkably, low values of
Tcol does not only guarantee the lowest data overhead, but
also the lowest RO (as results from the analysis described
in Section VII-B1). Moreover, the negative impact of such
overhead may be further reduced by colocating the RA with
the ISP (e.g., as a virtual machine). We stress on the fact that
the popularity-driven subdivision needs to be computed for
each cache storage. In this work, we consider that the storage
size can be of two types only: capacity of metro-core nodes
and capacity of metro-aggregation nodes (i.e., 10% and 5%
of the total size of the CPs’ catalogues, respectively). Hence,
the considered overhead needs to be accounted twice. Notice,
however, that this overhead is still acceptable, and it would
be acceptable even if more possibile caches’ capacity was
available. For example, if 10 types of cache sizes were present,
it would be required to execute the protocol 10 times. This
would imply, considering Tcol = 60 minutes, an overhead
of 12 Gb, which is ∼ 4 times the average size of the CPs’
contents in our simulations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving network-
neutrality-compliant protocol for caching of VoD contents in
ISP networks. The protocol guarantees that the ISP assigns
portions of its caches’ storage to several CPs proportionally to
the popularity of their contents (i.e., popularity-driven subdivi-
sion) and it is therefore compliant with neutrality requirements
recently proposed in the literature. Besides ensuring a NN-
compliant caching, the protocol also allows to meet CPs’ and
ISP’s privacy requirements, as the information about contents’
popularity and size of cache are not disclosed. We evaluated
how caching performance is influenced by a popularity-driven-
subdivision in terms of overall network resource occupation
and hit-ratio for ISP and CPs comparing it to baseline ap-
proaches, namely, static subdivision, where CPs are assigned
the same amount of storage independent of their popularity,
and resource-occupation-driven, where CPs are assigned an
amount of storage according to amount of capacity their
requests occupy in ISP’s network. To this aim, we developed a
dynamic VoD content caching and distribution simulator. We
found that the popularity-driven and the resource-occupation-
driven subdivisions lead to a reduction of the RO of up to
∼ 52% (and to an improvement of the hit-ratio of up to
∼ 32%) with respect to the static subdivision. In particular,
the minimum RO and the maximum hit-ratio are obtained with
the popularity-driven subdivision computed with our protocol.
Moreover, we observed that the RO is highly-influenced by
the frequency of execution of the protocol, that we assume to
be tuned by the ISP in order to minimize the RO. Numerical
results show that each CP experiences a loss in terms of its hit-
ratio with respect to the case where it could selflishly establish
this frequency. In the considered scenarios, this loss can range
from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of ∼ 27% and it
is much less significant when CPs’ popularity are similar.
Overall, our protocol proved to be beneficial in increasing
caching performance (e.g., RO is reduced) while ensuring the
protection of privacy. Note that privacy is protected also using
the benchmark approaches, but none of them guarantees that
the subdivision is actually compliant with NN requirements
(as our protocol, instead, ensures). We also evaluated the data
overhead introduced by the protocol and we conclude that it
is acceptable compared to the reduction of RO experienced
by the ISP. As a future work, we plan to extend our study
considering more challanging security models (e.g., malicious
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parties that can alter their data during the execution of the
protocol).
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